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ARTICLES 
The Impact of Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo 
on Trademark Protection of Other 
Marks 
Rachel Clark Hughey* 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 1991 World Series, featuring the Atlanta Braves, 
and the 1992 Super Bowl, featuring the Washington Redskins, 
activists opposing the use of these and other names derived from 
Native American names protested vehemently.1  That was just the 
beginning of an intense national debate that continues today.2 
Many collegiate and professional teams use mascots, logos, 
and names derived from Native American names and terms.3  
 
*    Associate, Merchant & Gould, Minneapolis, MN; Adjunct Professor, University of 
Minnesota Law School; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, magna cum laude, 
Order of the Coif, 2003; B.S., ChE, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Tau Beta Pi, 
2000.  The author would like to thank Professor Joan Howland for her help with earlier 
versions of this Article and Michael Hughey for his ongoing support. 
1 Laurel R. Davis, Protest Against the Use of Native American Mascots: A Challenge 
to Traditional American Identity, 17 J. SPORT & SOCIAL ISSUES 9, 11 (1993). 
2 The Native American mascot controversy has been called “sport’s thorniest word 
problem.” See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
3 At one time, over 2,600 teams in the United States used Native American names or 
symbols. Kristin E. Behrendt, Cancellation of the Washington Redskins’ Federal 
Trademark Registrations: Should Sports Team Name, Mascots, and Logos Contain 
Native American Symbolism?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 389, 396 n.34 (2000).  Since 
1969, over 600 high school, college, and minor league teams have eliminated these uses, 
most because of political pressure. Id.; see also Mark Gokavi, Pride or Contempt?, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2001, at 10D; S.L. Price, The Indian Wars, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 4, 2002, at 66.  Some of the teams that have changed their names 
include the University of Oklahoma “Big Red” in 1970, the Stanford “Indians” in 1972, 
the Dartmouth “Indians” in 1974, the Saint John’s University “Redmen” in 1994, the 
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Although several articles discuss the issue of Native American 
names used as sports team names generally,4 this Article focuses 
on the recent decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, which reversed the Trial Trademark and Appeal 
Board’s cancellation of the “Redskins” trademark.5 
This Article considers the use of Native American terms and 
images as mascots, logos, and names of sports teams in the wake 
of the recent Harjo decision.6  Part I of this Article gives a broad 
overview of the Native American mascot controversy, the structure 
of professional and collegiate licensing, and the attempts to limit 
use of Native American terms as mascots, logos, and names.  Part 
II reviews trademark law generally and the prohibition of 
trademark protection for disparaging and scandalous marks.  Part 
III discusses the Harjo case history, while Part IV considers the 
impact of trademark law generally and the Harjo decision 
specifically on the use of Native American mascots, logos, and 
names.  This Article concludes in Part V that (1) the court’s 
decision not to cancel the “Redskins” trademark will not affect 
most other Native American mascots, logos, and names, (2) other 
marks using Native American mascots, logos, and names could 
 
Miami of Ohio “Redskins” in 1996, as well as the Sioux City Iowa “Soos” (minor league 
baseball) and the Marquette University “Warriors”; some Native American team names 
that remain in use include the Atlanta “Braves” (baseball), the Chicago “Blackhawks” 
(hockey), the Cleveland “Indians” (baseball), the Kansas City “Chiefs” (football), the 
Washington “Redskins” (football), the Florida State University “Seminoles” (college), 
the University of Illinois “Fighting Illini” (college), and the University of North Dakota 
“Fighting Sioux” (college). Behrendt, at 395–96 & nn.34–36; Bruce C. Kelber, Note, 
“Scalping the Redskins:” Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native 
American Nicknames and Images on the Road to Racial Reform?, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 
533, 540–41 (1994); Gokavi, at 10D; Price, at 70–71; Jose Miguel Romero, Panel Calls 
for End to Indian Names, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 14, 2001, at D1. 
4 See, e.g., Kristine A. Brown, Native American Team Names and Mascots: 
Disparaging and Insensitive or Just a Part of the Game?, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 115, 128 
(2002) (“[I]t may be the economic impact resulting from favorable rulings for trademark 
challengers that will have a more direct effect on professional sports organizations.”); 
Kelber, supra note 3, at 575 (“[T]rademark law has the ability to respond to the social ills 
of racism in cases where owners of Native American team marks have ignored their 
responsibility.”); see also infra note 5. 
5 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D.D.C. 2003). 
6 Id. 
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still be cancelled, and (3) non-legal avenues may be more fruitful 
to change Native American mascots, logos, and names. 
I.  THE NATIVE AMERICAN MASCOT CONTROVERSY AND  
ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE USE OF NATIVE AMERICAN  
MASCOTS, LOGOS, AND NAMES 
Native American names and images are frequently used as 
mascots, logos, and names of sports teams.7  For example, the 
athletic teams at Florida State University are known as the 
Seminoles, and the school mascot is Chief Osceola.8  At the 
beginning of every home football game, a student, representing 
Chief Osecola, “wearing moccasins, a tasseled leather ‘Indian’ 
outfit, face paint, and a large bandanna, hoisting a large feathered 
lance . . . ‘charges down the field riding an appaloosa horse named 
Renegade and hurls a flaming lance at midfield.’”9  The student 
body sings the “war chant” and engages in the infamous 
“tomahawk chop.”10 
Critics have suggested that “[t]o characterize the indigenous 
Seminole people or any other Native nation of North America as 
 
7 See supra note 3.  Other sports team names are also derived from ethnic terms, 
including the Minnesota “Vikings,” the Montreal “Canadiens,” the Notre Dame “Fighting 
Irish,” the Bethany College “Swedes,” the Edinboro University “Fighting Scots,” the Iona 
“Gaels,” the Sonoma State University “Cossacks,” the Idaho “Vandals,” the Southern 
California “Trojans,” the Mississippi “Rebels,” the Louisiana-Lafayette “Ragin’ Cajuns,” 
the Pennsylvania “Quakers,” the Alaska “Nanooks,” and the San Diego State University 
“Aztecs”; see also Tom Dangelo, Look.  Hard.  Are You Offended?, PALM BEACH POST, 
Apr. 4, 2002, at C1. 
8 C. Richard King & Charles Fruehling Springwood, The Best Offense . . . 
Dissociation, Desire and the Defense of the Florida State University Seminoles, in TEAM 
SPIRITS: THE NATIVE AMERICAN MASCOTS CONTROVERSY 130–31 (2000) (Chief Osceola 
is “the famous Seminole who led an armed resistance against the United States in the 
1830s.”). 
9 Id. at 130.  It is considered an honor to be chosen to impersonate Chief Osceola. Id. 
at 138–39.  The student chosen must display a “high moral character” and serve a two-
year apprenticeship. Id. 
10 Id. at 131.  Fans of other teams, such as the Braves, also engage in the “tomahawk 
chop.” Julie Cart, What’s in a Nickname?  The Ability to Stir Players and Fans Is Taking 
a Back Seat to Heightened Sensibilities, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at C1. 
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warlike or bellicose dehumanizes and demonizes them.”11  
Supporters, however, quickly point out that neither James E. Billie, 
chair of the Seminole Tribe of Florida, nor the Seminole people 
disapprove of the logo, name, or mascot.12  Interestingly, Florida 
State University reportedly earns as much as $1.8 million each 
year selling merchandise with the team name and mascot.13 
A. Professional and Collegiate Mascots, Logos, and Names 
Teams that use Native American terms as mascots, logos, and 
names include the Atlanta “Braves” professional baseball 
organization,14 the Chicago “Blackhawks” professional hockey 
organization,15 the Cleveland “Indians” professional baseball 
 
11 King & Springwood, supra note 8, at 141; see also Terence Dougherty, Group Rights 
to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property Rights in Native American Cultural Symbols, 
29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 376 (1998) (“Use of these [trademarked] names and 
images, some more than others, is dehumanizing to many Native Americans.”); Nell 
Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. 
REV. 1003, 1010–11 (1995).  Native American stereotypes reinforce “the fact that [Native 
Americans] are presented as ahistorical and contextless.” Id.  Furthermore, “by rendering 
native people as inhuman, timeless, and essentialized, these images help promote the 
myth of the vanishing Indian and in so doing, deprive Indians not just of their history but 
of their present reality.” Id. 
12 King & Springwood, supra note 8, at 144.  Florida State University has the approval 
of the Seminole tribe to use the “Seminole” name. Dangelo, supra note 7, at C1. 
13 King & Springwood, supra note 8, at 145. 
14 Among others, the Atlanta National League Baseball Club owns the following 
trademarks: U.S. Trademark Registration Numbers 1,596,052 (registered May 15, 1990) 
(“Braves”); 1,562,115 (registered Oct. 24, 1989) (“Braves”); 1,561,774 (registered Oct. 
24, 1989) (“Atlanta Braves”); 1,484,697 (registered Apr. 12, 1988)  (“Atlanta Braves”); 
845,032 (registered Feb. 27, 1968) (“Braves”); 829,310 (registered May 23, 1967) 
(picture of a head of a Native American screaming with a Mohawk and a single feather in 
his hair); 829,309 (registered May 23, 1967) (“Braves”) (“Braves” in script below a 
Native American man’s screaming head with a single feather in his hair and a Mohawk); 
and 829,308 (registered May 23, 1967) (“Braves”).  This information is available on the 
Trademark Electronic Search System, at http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm 
(“TESS”) (last visited Feb. 10, 2004). 
15 Among others, the Chicago Blackhawk Hockey Team owns the following 
trademarks: U.S. Trademark Registration Numbers 1,959,134 (registered Feb. 27, 1996) 
(“Black Hawks Chicago”) (circle with the words “Black Hawks Chicago” around the 
profile of a Native American man with feathers in his hair and braids); 1,671,825 
(registered Jan. 14, 1992) (profile of a Native American man with feathers in his hair); 
1,671,824 (registered Jan. 14, 1992) (“Blackhawks”); 893,053 (registered June 16, 1970) 
(profile of a Native American man with feathers in his hair); and 893,052 (registered June 
16, 1970) (“Blackhawks”). See TESS, supra note 14. 
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organization,16 the Kansas City “Chiefs” professional football 
organization,17 the Florida State University “Seminoles,”18 the 
University of Illinois “Fighting Illini,”19 and the University of 
 
16 Among others, the Cleveland Indians own the following trademarks: U.S. Trademark 
Registration Numbers 2,569,766 (registered May 14, 2002) (head of a large smiling, big-
nosed Native American man with a single feather in his hair); 1,719,618 (registered Sept. 
22, 1992) (“Indians”) (fat, cartoonish Native American man with a very large nose 
wearing an “Indians” jersey and leaning on a baseball bat); 1,711,810 (registered Sept. 1, 
1992) (the head of a large-smiling, big hook-nosed Native American man with a single 
feather in his hair and a small braid); 1,592,740 (registered Apr. 24, 1990) (“Indians”); 
1,590,703 (registered Apr. 10, 1990) (head of a large-smiling, big-nosed Native 
American man with a single feather in his hair); 1,568,426 (registered Nov. 28, 1989) 
(profile of a Native American man wearing a large feather headdress); 1,543,339 
(registered June 13, 1989) (“Indians”); 1,259,795 (registered Dec. 6, 1983) (the head of a 
large-smiling, big-nosed Native American man with a single feather in his hair); 
1,031,410 (registered Jan. 27, 1976) (the head of a large-smiling, big-nosed Native 
American man with a single feather in his hair). See TESS, supra note 14.  The visage of 
the Cleveland Indians’ mascot, Chief Wahoo, has been described by “grinning buck teeth 
and [a] hook nose.” Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, The Indians’ Chief Problem: Chief 
Wahoo as State Sponsored Discrimination and a Disparaging Mark, 46 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 211, 214 (1998).  Scholars have suggested that Chief Wahoo is scandalous and 
disparaging, but without significant analysis. Id. at 232–33.  The Cleveland franchise is 
currently worth a considerable amount of money, and in 1999, the team was sold for 
$320 million cash. See Chris Havel, Brewers Need New Owners, Not a New Manager, 
GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, Apr. 19, 2002, at C1. 
17 Among others, the Kansas City Chiefs Football Club owns the following marks: U.S. 
Trademark Registration Numbers 1,849,868 (registered Aug. 16, 1994) (“KC”) (football 
helmet with an arrowhead on it with the initials “KC” in the arrowhead); 1,807,453 
(registered Nov. 30, 1993) (“Kansas City Chiefs”); 1,085,091 (registered Feb. 7, 1978) 
(“Chiefs”); 981,462 (registered Mar. 26, 1974) (“KC Chiefs”) (football helmet with an 
arrowhead on it with the initials “KC” in it and the word “Chiefs” below the helmet); 
982,132 (registered Apr. 9, 1974) (“Kansas City Chiefs KC”); and 974,207 (registered 
Nov. 27, 1973) (“Kansas City Chiefs”). See TESS, supra note 14. 
18 The Florida Board of Regents owns several marks for and on behalf of Florida State 
University, including U.S. Trademark Registration Number 2,641,958 (registered Oct. 
29, 2002) (“FSU”) and Serial Number 76,219,843 (filed Mar. 5, 2001) (“Seminoles”). 
See TESS, supra note 14. 
19 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois owns several trademarks, 
including U.S. Trademark Registration Numbers 2,230,527 (registered Mar. 9, 1999) 
(“Fighting Illini”), 2,232,024 (registered Mar. 16, 1999) (the head of a Native American 
wearing a very large circular feather headdress), and 1,725,610 (registered Oct. 20, 1992) 
(“Illinibook”). See TESS, supra note 14.  The mascot of the University of Illinois, the 
“Illini,” is Chief Illiniwek. David Prochaska, At Home in Illinois: Presence of Chief 
Illiniwek, Absence of Native Americans, in TEAM SPIRITS: THE NATIVE AMERICAN 
MASCOTS CONTROVERSY 157–85 (C. Richard King & Charles Fruehling Springwood eds., 
2000) (discussing Chief Illiniwek and the pro- and anti-chief movements in great detail).  
The University of Illinois already has been punished as violating free speech when it 
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North Dakota “Fighting Sioux.”20  Sales of professional team 
apparel generate over a billion dollars a year,21 and several major 
college teams earn millions each year.22  Although most 
professional teams and many college teams own trademarks on 
their names and logos, most high schools and amateur teams do not 
own trademarks.23 
To discourage any one team from gaining a significant 
financial advantage over other teams based solely on its logo, 
many professional leagues engage in profit-sharing.24  For 
 
prohibited its staff members who disapprove of the mascot from discouraging recruits. 
See Associated Press, Opponents of American Indian Mascot Win Damages; U of Illinois 
Must Pay $5,000, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 23, 2002, at B4. 
20 The Ralph Engelstad Arena, Inc., the organization that built the hockey arena of the 
University of North Dakota “Fighting Sioux” with money donated by Ralph Engelstad, 
applied for the U.S. Trademark Serial Number 76,197,760, filed on January 22, 2001 
(“Ralph Engelstad Arena Home of the Fighting Sioux”) (text circling a profile of a Native 
American with feathers in his hair), but abandoned the mark on June 13, 2003. See TESS, 
supra note 14.  Engelstad, a North Dakota alumnus and the school’s largest benefactor, 
donated over a hundred million dollars to the school, and repeatedly threatened to cut off 
funding if the school changed its mascot. Richard Meryhew, N.D. Arena Benefactor 
Ralph L. Engelstad Dies at 72: UND’s Largest Donor was Center of Indian Mascot 
Controversy, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 28, 2002, at B1.  It is unclear 
whether his death will affect the school’s decision to retain the name. Id. 
21 Calvin Sims, It’s Not Just How Well You Play the Game . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
1993, § 3, at 5 (pointing out that in 1992 alone, estimates suggest that Major League 
Baseball sold about $2.4 billion in licensed merchandise, the National Football League 
sold about $2.1 billion, the National Basketball Association sold about $1.4 billion, and 
the National Hockey League sold about $600 million).  When the Minnesota Twins won 
the World Series in 1987, retail sales of postseason merchandise hit $40 million. Susan 
Feyder, Twins Fever: Some Businesses Have It; Others Sweat It Out, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Oct. 1, 1991, at A1; see also Tony Munroe, Burgundy and Gold 
Sales Super—So Long as the Redskins Win, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1992, at C6 
(“Souvenir hawkers are racking up sales as the Redskins enjoy their best season ever.”). 
22 See Kelber, supra note 3, 549–50 (“The Collegiate Licensing Company, which 
coordinates licensing agreements for 126 colleges and universities, estimates that college 
merchandising has reached nearly $1.5 billion in sales during 1992.”).  Furthermore, 
many college teams rely on licensing their trademarks for revenue. College Report: New 
Saluki Emblem Makes Its Debut, ST. J. REG. (Springfield, IL), Aug. 12, 2001, at 20 (“The 
new logo is expected to increase revenue for the university through licensing agreements 
with manufacturers who produce sweatshirts, caps and similar items.  Licensing the use 
of one official trademark will enhance the visibility of the athletics program and also lead 
to additional merchandise sales, university officials said.”); see also supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
23 See, e.g., supra notes 14–20. 
24 See infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
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example, the National Football League (“NFL”) grants licenses on 
the trademarked names, and profits are shared evenly between all 
of the franchises.25  Other professional leagues, such as Major 
League Baseball (“MLB”) and the National Hockey League 
(“NHL”), similarly engage in profit-sharing.26  College teams, 
 
25 See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 459 (2d ed. 1998); 
see also Jamie Beckett, NFL’s Big Merchandising Play, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10, 1990, at 
C1 (“NFL Properties, which licenses products for the 49ers and the other 27 NFL teams, 
ambitiously plans for these and other new products to draw $1 billion in retail sales this 
year, up from $650 million last year. . . . In all, NFL Properties has signed up 385 
licensees—79 more than last year and more than any other Professional sports 
concern . . . . Major League Baseball is second with 350.  To get a product licensed by 
the NFL, companies generally must pay an amount equal to 9 percent of the wholesale 
price of the item . . . . The NFL has come a long way since 1964, the year then-league 
Commissioner Pete Rozell (who later developed the Super Bowl) formed NFL Properties 
to license and manage team trademarks.”); Brooke A. Masters, Redskins Lose Right to 
Trademark Protection, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1999, at A1 (“A portion of revenue from the 
sale of NFL merchandise is kept by the league, and the rest is distributed evenly among 
all the teams, generating about $5 million a year for each club.”); Price, supra note 3, at 
70.  The National Football League made $650 million in retail sales during the 1989 
football season. Beckett, at C1.  Ten of the twenty-eight teams accounted for about 
seventy percent of the total sales. Id.  The sixth highest grossing team with 5.4 percent of 
the total retail sales was the Washington Redskins. Id.  Many scholars have failed to 
address the impact of profit-sharing in their suggestion that financial motives will cause 
the Redskins to cease using the name. See, e.g., Behrendt, supra note 3, at 413 
(“Consequently, it is possible that the [Redskins] will lose a large sum of money from 
royalties that they would have otherwise obtained if the marks were licensed.”). 
26 See Don Walker, Baseball Making Pick Move: It Wants Vendors of Fake 
Merchandise Out at All-Star Plate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 25, 2002, at 1C 
(“Major League Baseball . . . generally receives 10% to 12% of the wholesale price of 
products it licenses to use team or league trademarks.”); David Naylor, CFL Moving to 
Own All Team Names and Logos, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Oct. 30, 2001, at S3 
(“Bernadette Mansur, vice-president of communications for the National Hockey League, 
confirmed that in professional hockey, the league, not the teams, owns the respective 
trademarks and logos.”); see also Danny O’Neil, Buyers Beware on Merchandise, 
SEATTLE TIMES, July 8, 2001, at I4 (discussing the problem of unlicensed vendors 
generally).  Major League Baseball uses an organization, Major League Baseball 
Properties, Inc., to license for it. See D’Angelo v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club L.P., 
No. 97-12446-GAO, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18233 (D. Mass. July 9, 2001); Major 
League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Sed Olet Denarius, Ltd., No. 90 CIV. 2170, 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13108 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1990).  The National Hockey League teams use an 
organization, National Hockey League Services, Inc., to license trademarks for them. See 
Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 459 
(N.D. Tex. 1973). 
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however, license their own trademarks and do not engage in profit-
sharing.27 
B. Attempts to Limit the Use of Native American Mascots, Logos, 
and Names 
The use of Native American names and images has been called 
“sport’s thorniest word problem.”28  The U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights passed a resolution condemning the use of Native 
American nicknames for sports teams.29  Many types of legal 
arguments have been suggested to challenge the use of Native 
American terms as sports names, including (1) public 
accommodations claims under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,30 (2) hostile environment claims under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,31 (3) arguments that names are “insignia” that 
 
27 Actually, many college teams hire a corporation, such as the Collegiate Licensing 
Company (“CLC”), the largest collegiate licensing corporation, to license trademarks for 
the colleges. See Collegiate Licensing Company, at http://www.clc.com (last visited Feb. 
12, 2004).  Florida State University, the University of Illinois, and the University of 
North Dakota use CLC to license. Id.  To obtain a license, applicants must pay significant 
amounts of money to the CLC for services ranging from the application fee to marketing 
and product development costs. See id.  Although the fees vary depending on the school 
the applicant wishes to license, Florida State University, the University of Illinois, and 
the University of North Dakota each charge an eight percent royalty rate. See id.  From 
July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002, Florida State University was ranked seventh among the 
top-selling CLC member colleges (following University of North Carolina, University of 
Michigan, University of Tennessee, University of Nebraska, University of Florida, and 
Pennsylvania State University). See id.  University of Illinois was twenty-first, and 
University of North Dakota was last, at fiftieth. Id.  Although the exact rankings vary 
from year to year, these results are consistent with past rankings. See supra notes 13, 22, 
26 and accompanying text. 
28 Price, supra note 3, at 68. 
29 Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Statement of the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights on the Use of Native American Images and Nicknames as Sports Symbols 
(2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov/press/prsndx.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2003); see Scott R. Rosner, Legal Approaches to the Use of 
Native American Logos and Symbols in Sports, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 258, 266–67 
(2002); Note, A Public Accommodations Challenge to the Use of Indian Team Names and 
Mascots in Professional Sports, 112 HARV. L. REV. 904, 906 (1999) (arguing that “a Title 
II challenge should succeed if a claimant can make a factual showing that the name or 
mascot of a sports team deters the patronage of a substantial number of American 
Indians”). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); see Daniel J. Trainor, Native American Mascots, Schools, 
and the Title VI Hostile Environment Analysis, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 971 (1995). 
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should not be allowed trademark protection under section 2(b) of 
the Lanham Act,32 (4) tribal court actions,33 (5) commercial speech 
and First Amendment challenges,34 (6) challenges to state laws on 
license plates,35 (7) claims of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress,36 (8) claims of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,37 and (9) challenges using hate speech codes and 
discrimination laws.38 
Arguably, the most successful legal challenges to date involve 
attacking the propriety of the trademark protection of the mark 
under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.39  In addition to legal 
options, Native American advocates have staged protests 
surrounding major sporting events and spoken out in the media.40  
While these protests also have been successful in changing some 
 
32 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2002); see Maury Audet, Native American Tribal Names as 
Monikers and Logos: Will These Registrations Withstand Cancellation Under Lanham 
Act § 2(b) After the Trademark Study on Official Insignia of Native American Tribes?, 2 
J. INTELL. PROP. 4 (2000). 
33 See Newton, supra note 11, at 1005. 
34 See Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports 
Team Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 65 (1997); 
see also Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 223 (arguing that “Chief Wahoo violates the First 
Amendment by chilling the desire and ability of Native Americans to exercise fully their 
First Amendment rights”); Rosner, supra note 30, at 259–62.  For a discussion of the 
relation of First Amendment law to trademark law, see Justin Blankenship, Note, The 
Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law an 
Appropriate Solution for Words That Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 415, 419–20 (2001); 
Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of Redskins?, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 665 (2000). 
35 See McBride v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Utah State Tax Comm’n, 977 P.2d 467, 468 
(Utah 1999); see also Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, “Lions and Tigers and Bears, Oh 
My” or “Redskins and Braves and Indians, Oh Why”: Ruminations on McBride v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, Political Correctness, and the Reasonable Person, 36 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 11 (1999). 
36 See Aaron Goldstein, Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Another 
Attempt at Eliminating Native American Mascots, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 689, 691 
(2000). 
37 See Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 211. 
38 See id.; Rosner, supra note 30, at 262–66. 
39 See, e.g., Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 
1999).  The Harjo decision was the first case in which a federal agency came down on 
the side of Native Americans. See Masters, supra note 25, at A1.  The Harjo decision, 
and its subsequent reversal, will be discussed in great detail later in this Article. 
40 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 118–19; Davis, supra note 1, at 11. 
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school mascots and team names, they have had little effect on 
changing professional team names.41 
II.  TRADEMARK LAW 
Trademark protection exists under both state and federal law.42  
Federal trademark law, under the Lanham Act,43 defines a 
trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof . . . [used] to identify and distinguish . . . 
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or 
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.”44  A trademark owner has the right to exclude 
others from using any mark when there is a likelihood of confusion 
as to the origin or sponsorship of goods or services.45 
The Lanham Act is premised on the recognition that when a 
party has expended resources to develop an identification for its 
product, it is not equitable to allow another, who has made no such 
expenditure, to use the unique symbol and to trade on the original 
party’s goodwill and reputation to promote his or her own goods or 
services.46  There are several benefits to federal trademark 
registration, including nationwide constructive notice and 
incontestability of the mark after five years.47  There can be many 
registrations for a single word, as some of the registrations might 
be for different goods, or different symbols or drawings that 
 
41 See Kelber, supra note 3, at 538–44 (discussing the impact of protesters on the 
changing of names); Indian Nickname Dropped, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 25, 1993, 
at B6 (noting that protesters convinced thirty-one of fifty Minnesota high schools with 
Native American team names to cease use); see also supra note 3 (outlining the history of 
schools changing their Native American team names). But see Blankenship, supra note 
34, at 456 (noting that to date no professional teams have changed their names). 
42 If a mark loses federal trademark protection for public policy reasons, it likely will 
not qualify for state protection either. See De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 F. 341 (W.D. Pa. 
1912); see also Blankenship, supra note 34, at 452–53 & nn.231–32. 
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2002). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
45 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
46 Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg, Inc. 510 F.2d 1004, 
1110–11 (5th Cir. 1975); Minneapple Co. v. Normandin, 338 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 
1983); see also 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 1 (2003). 
47 15 U.S.C. § 1065. 
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accompany the word.  Similarly, a mark can obtain secondary 
meaning if the new meaning subsumes its original meaning, and 
the public associates the mark with the new meaning and not the 
original one.48 
A petitioner may obtain a federal trademark by filing a 
trademark application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”).49  To obtain federal trademark protection, the mark 
must be used in commerce,50 and must not violate certain statutory 
provisions.51  If the USPTO rejects the trademark application, the 
petitioner may appeal the decision to the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board (“TTAB”).52  Decisions from the TTAB may be 
appealed to either the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia or to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.53 
A. Overview of Disparaging and Scandalous Marks 
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act forbids the registration of any 
mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or 
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely 
suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, 
 
48 Merriam v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912) (noting that secondary 
meaning “contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in that sense primarily, 
incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the market, because 
geographically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and 
so exclusively by one producer . . . the word or phrase had come to mean that the article 
was his product; in other words . . . the word had come to be . . . his trademark.”). 
49 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
50 See id. 
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  Under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, trademark protection 
will be denied if the mark “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous 
matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, 
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or 
disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1070.  Cancellations of existing trademarks may also be appealed to 
the board. Id.  Protection under various state trademark laws is not affected by board 
decisions.  Some courts have suggested, however, that if a mark is not entitled to federal 
registration because of the mark’s content, the mark is also not entitled to state trademark 
protection. See, e.g., De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 F. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1912). 
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 1071.  Under 15 U.S.C. § 1071, a party can appeal from a decision 
of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, or commence a civil action in the District of Columbia, if the action is 
between parties who reside in different states. 
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beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or 
disrepute . . . .”54  In order for a mark to be cancelled under section 
2(a), the mark must have been scandalous or disparaging when it 
was originally granted.55 
Several older decisions considered scandalousness and 
disparagement under section 2(a) as a single issue,56 and marks 
that were canceled using section 2(a) were “predominantly risqué 
or vulgar depictions of bodily functions.”57  In recent years, 
however, the distinctions between scandalous and disparaging 
marks have been clarified, and section 2(a) has been used to cancel 
a variety of scandalous and disparaging trademarks.58 
1. Scandalous Marks Are Not Afforded Protection 
Courts have held that for a trademark to be denied registration 
as scandalous, it must offend a “‘substantial composite of the 
general population’”59 in the context of contemporary norms.60  
The mark must shock a sense of truth, decency, or propriety, as 
well as be disgraceful, offensive, or disreputable, while “‘giving 
offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or] calling out 
[for] condemnation.’”61  Courts first evaluate the meaning of the 
 
54 15 U.SC. § 1052(a). 
55 15 U.SC. § 1064(3). 
56 See, e.g., In re Waughtel, 138 U.S.P.Q. 595 (T.T.A.B. 1963); In re Reemtsma 
CigarettenFabriken G.m.b.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959). 
57 Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral” and “Scandalous” 
Trademarks Should Be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 192 (1996). 
58 See, e.g., Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 1999).  
This case will be discussed in great detail later in this Article.  For a detailed discussion 
of marks found to be disparaging or scandalous, see Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration 
of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: 
Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Registered Trademark?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 331 
(1993), and for a detailed discussion on the standards of what is scandalous or 
disparaging, see Ethan G. Zlotchew, “Scandalous” or “Disparaging”?  It Should Make a 
Difference in Opposition and Cancellations Actions: Views on the Lanham Act’s Section 
2(a) Prohibitions Using the Example of Native American Symbolism in Athletics, 22 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 217 (1998). 
59 In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re 
McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
60 Id. (citing In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1219 (T.T.A.B. 
1993)). 
61 Id. (citing In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938)). 
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term in question, and then determine whether it is scandalous to a 
substantial composite of the general public.62 
Using this standard, the Federal Circuit in In re Mavety Media 
Group Ltd. held that the use of the trademark “black tail” in 
connection with adult magazines was not scandalous.63  The 
Mavety court64 referred to other marks that courts had found not to 
be scandalous, including “Old Glory Condom Corp.” and its stars 
and stripes design on its condoms,65 “Moonies” for dolls whose 
pants drop,66 “Big Pecker Brand” for tee-shirts,67 “Badass” for 
bridges of stringed musical instruments,68 “Week-end Sex” for 
magazines,69 “Acapulco Gold” (which is a synonym for marijuana) 
for suntan lotion,70 and “Libido” for perfume.71  In contrast, in 
1938 the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the 
predecessor to the Federal Circuit) held that the use of the 
trademark “Madonna” on wine was scandalous.72  Other marks that 
courts have found to be scandalous include “Dickheads” for 
restaurant services,73 “Bullshit” for personal accessories,74 a 
“cartoon-like representation of a melancholy, unclothed male 
figure ruefully contemplating an unseen portion of his genitalia” 
 
62 Id. (citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981)) (alteration in 
original). 
63 Id. at 1370. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1371 (citing In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 
1993)). 
66 Id. (citing In re In Over Our Heads Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990)). The 
court also found that this mark was not disparaging to people of the Unification Church. 
Id. 
67 Id. (citing In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988)). 
68 Id. (citing In re Leo Quan Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. 370 (T.T.A.B. 1978)). 
69 Id. (citing In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. 334 (T.T.A.B. 1973)). 
70 Id. (citing In re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. 512 (T.T.A.B. 1972)). 
71 Id. at 1372 (citing Ex parte Parfum L’Orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q. 481 (Pat. Off. Exam’r-
in-Chief 1952)). 
72 Id. (citing In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938)); see also In re 
P.J. Valckenbeg, G.m.b.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (also holding that use of 
the mark “Madonna” for wine was scandalous). 
73 In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929 (T.T.A.B. 1996). 
74 Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1372 (citing In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 863 (T.T.A.B. 
1981)). 
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for penis corrective implements,75 “Bubby Trap” for brassieres,76 
“Messias” for wine and brandy,77 “Agnus Dei” for metallic 
tabernacles,78 and “Queen Mary” for women’s underwear.79 
2. Disparaging Marks Are Not Afforded Protection 
A trademark will not be granted protection if it is held to be 
disparaging.80  A mark is disparaging if it would “dishonor by 
comparison with what is inferior, slight, deprecate, degrade, or 
affect or injure by unjust comparison.”81  When evaluating 
disparagement, courts as well as the TTAB consider “only the 
perceptions of those referred to, identified or implicated in some 
recognizable manner by the involved [trade]mark”82 which is to be 
evaluated as of the date of registration of the mark. 
Using this standard, the TTAB has found a variety of marks to 
be disparaging.  The trademark and design for “Budda Beachwear” 
clothing was held to be disparaging in view of a particular 
 
75 In re Thomas Labs, Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. 50, 51–52 (T.T.A.B. 1975); see also In re 
McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 482 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that a “photograph of a nude man 
and woman kissing and embracing in a manner appearing to expose the male genitalia” 
for “Newsletter Devoted to Social and Interpersonal Relationship Topics” and “Social 
Club Services” was scandalous). 
76 Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1372 (citing In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971)). 
77 Id. (citing In re Sociedade Agricola E. Comerical Dos Vinhos Messias, S.A.R.L., 
159 U.S.P.Q. 275 (T.T.A.B. 1968)). 
78 Id. (citing Ex parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. 22 (Comm’r 
Pats. 1943)).  The Summit court suggested that “[t]o commercialize an emblem of such 
highly sacred religious significance would . . . be offensive to most individuals of the 
Christian faith, and thus scandalous within the meaning of the statute.” Summit, 59 
U.S.P.Q. at 23. 
79 Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1372 (citing Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. 156 
(Comm’r Pats. 1938)). 
80 In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685, 1688 (T.T.A.B. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 
32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994). 
81 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1738 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 1999). 
82 Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1688.  Although earlier cases held that a “reasonable person 
of ordinary sensibilities” must consider the trademark offensive or objectionable, see, 
e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639 (T.T.A.B. 1988), 
the law appears well settled that only the perceptions of the allegedly disparaged group 
matters. Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q. at 1688; see Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Renaming the 
Redskins (and the Florida State Seminoles?): The Trademark Registration Decision and 
Alternative Remedies, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 287 (1999) [hereinafter Guggenheim, 
Renaming the Redskins]. 
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religious group because of the depiction of Buddha.83  The 
trademark “Doughboy” and a picture of a soldier for an anti-
venereal medication was found to be disparaging to World War I 
soldiers.84  The trademark “Senussi” for cigarettes was determined 
to be disparaging to a small Muslim sect of the same name that 
forbade the use of tobacco.85  Additionally, a trademark consisting 
of a design of a large “X” over a hammer and sickle design for 
“patriotic educational services, namely, dissemination of 
information relative to United States laws concerning activities of 
the communist party” was found to disparage the national symbol 
of the Soviet Union.86  On the other hand, the trademark “Amish” 
as used for cigars was found not to be disparaging to Amish people 
because of evidence that the Amish faith permits smoking, and at 
least seventy-five percent of Amish men smoke.87  Further, the 
trademark “Jap” for women’s clothing was held not to disparage 
Japanese people.88 
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF HARJO 
In 1994, several Native American petitioners filed a complaint 
with the TTAB seeking the cancellation of the trademark 
“Redskins” and several other derivations of the term under section 
2(a) of the Lanham Act.89  The trademark “Redskins” belongs to 
the NFL franchise in Washington, D.C.90 
 
83 Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1688. 
84 Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese Chemical Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 227 (T.T.A.B. 1951). 
85 In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH, 122 U.S.P.Q. 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959).  This 
mark was also held to be disparaging. Id.  The court in this case appears to consider 
scandalousness and disparagement under section 2(a) as a single issue. See Harjo v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1737 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 1999). 
86 In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Congress, Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. 304, 305 
(T.T.A.B. 1969). 
87 In re Waughtel, 138 U.S.P.Q. 594 (T.T.A.B. 1963).  This mark was also held not to 
be scandalous. Id.  The court in this case appears to consider scandalousness and 
disparagement under Section 2(a) as a single issue. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1737. 
88 In re Condas, 188 U.S.P.Q. 544 (T.T.A.B. 1975). 
89 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 1994).  
Each of the plaintiffs was an enrolled member of a federally recognized Native American 
tribe. Id.  The plaintiffs included Suzan Shown Harjo, Raymond D.  
Apodaca, Vine Deloria, Jr., Norbert S. Hill, Jr., Mateo Romero, William A.  
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In support of their petition for cancellation, the Native 
American petitioners suggested that the marks were “pejorative, 
derogatory, degrading, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous, 
disreputable, disparaging and racist” in violation of section 2(a) of 
the Lanham Act.91  Respondent Pro-Football, owner of the 
“Redskins” trademark, replied with several affirmative defenses, 
including (1) the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, (2) petitioners lacked standing, (3) the petition 
was barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, (4) the petition 
was barred by laches, (5) the trademarks acquired had a strong 
secondary meaning, (6) petitioners had not been harmed, (7) 
petitioners failed to state special damages, (8) the use of the 
trademarks was protected by the First Amendment, and (9) section 
2(a) of the Lanham Act was unconstitutionally overbroad and 
unconstitutionally vague.92 
After considering the respondent’s arguments, the TTAB 
quickly dispensed with most of the affirmative defenses.93  The 
TTAB held that the “petitioners [had] pleaded a legitimate interest 
in the outcome of this proceeding” because the petitioners were 
Native Americans and the term “Redskin” offended them.94  The 
TTAB further held that the defenses of laches and estoppel were 
not available because of public policy concerns and that there was 
 
Means, and Manley A. Begay, Jr. Id. at 1829.  The lead plaintiff, Suzan Shown Harjo, is 
a Cheyenne and Hodulgee Muskogee, and the great-great-granddaughter of Chief Bull 
Bear, a Cheyenne peace chief. See Adrienne T. Washington, Indian Activist Tackles 
Football, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at C4.  She is also a lecturer, curator, award-
winning journalist, and public-policy analyst, championing such causes as Native 
American land rights and Native American policy and law. Id.  She also acted as a special 
assistant for Native American legislation and liaison to President Jimmy Carter and as 
executive director of the National Congress of Native Americans. Id.  In the early 1970s, 
she went to a Washington Redskins football game and was horrified at the portrayal of 
Native Americans. Id.  At the game, she was subject to hair pulling, pointing, and poking. 
Id. 
90 Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1830. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1830–31. 
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no requirement that actual damages be proven.95  The TTAB did 
not address the constitutional defenses, ruling that the defenses 
were outside of the TTAB’s authority.96  Moreover, the TTAB at 
that time did not decide whether the challenged marks were 
scandalous or disparaging. 
A. The TTAB’s Decision That the Trademark Was Disparaging 
In 1999, the cancellation proceeding was again before the 
TTAB.97  The petitioners challenged the  “Redskins” trademark 
and other variations of that trademark.98  The petitioners again 
asserted that the trademarks were “pejorative, derogatory, 
denigrating, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous, disreputable, 
disparaging and racist designation for a Native American 
person.”99  This time, however, they also asserted that the 
“registrant’s use of the [trademarks] in the identified registrations 
offends petitioners and other Native Americans” and that “the 
[trademarks] in the identified registrations consist of or comprise 
matter which disparages Native American persons, and brings 
them into contempt, ridicule, and disrepute.”100  As such, 
petitioners asserted that the trademarks violated section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act.101 
In support of their petition to cancel the trademarks, the 
petitioners offered a variety of evidence.  Petitioners first 
contended that the word “redskin”—which they asserted was a 
deeply offensive racial slur—rarely appeared in formal writings in 
reference to Native Americans.102  Petitioners then presented  
 
 
95 Id.  The TTAB held that the laches defense was unavailable after determining that 
the plaintiffs were advocating on behalf of a broad public interest, while the defendant’s 
interests were private. Id. at 1831. 
96 Id. at 1833. 
97 See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 1999). 
98 Id. at 1707.  The challenged words and marks are U.S. Trademark Registration 
Numbers 1,606,810 (“Redskinettes”), 1,085,092 (“Redskins”), 987,127 (“The 
Redskins”), 986,668 (“Washington Redskins”), 978,824 (“Washington Redskins”), and 
836,122 (“The Redskins”). Id. at 1705. 
99 Id. at 1708. 
100 Id. (citations omitted). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1719. 
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testimony from a linguistics expert that lexicographers had 
considered the word disparaging since the 1960s and that the term 
was not used because it was “a loaded pejorative term.”103  In 
addition, they presented testimony from a historian who suggested 
that the term is “an artifact of an earlier period during which the 
public at large was taught to believe that American Indians were a 
backward and uncivilized people.”104  Petitioners also proffered 
evidence that the word “has been and is used with connotations of 
violence, savagery, and oppression” and “suggests a power 
relationship, with the whites in control, and the Indians in a 
position of servitude or capture.”105  The petitioners noted that 
when the term had been used in film, it was frequently “coupled 
with negative adjectives such as ‘dirty,’ or ‘lying’; or that the word 
was used in the context of violence, savagery, or dishonesty.”106  
The petitioners suggested that “sports team names are chosen to 
reflect the team’s location or to sound fierce . . . so as, in a 
symbolic way, to strike fear into the hearts of opponents.”107  They 
presented expert testimony that the use of the term “redskin” 
perpetuates stereotypes, and that racial stereotyping “can lead to 
serious psychological disturbance such as depression [and] low 
self-esteem.”108  Finally, the petitioners introduced a resolution 
from the National Congress of American Indians condemning the 
word.109 
Furthermore, the petitioners offered the results of a telephone 
survey, where randomly selected adults were asked whether the 
terms “Native American,” “buck,” “brave,” “redskin,” “Injun,” 
“Indian,” and “squaw” were offensive to them or others, and, if so, 
why.110  Of the general population, the term “Injun” was the most 
offensive (with 49.5 percent of respondents claiming it was 
offensive to them), followed by “redskin” (46.2 percent), “squaw” 
(36.2 percent), “buck” (36.5 percent), “brave” (10.0 percent), 
 
103 Id. at 1720 (citation omitted). 
104 Id. at 1726 (citation omitted). 
105 Id. at 1720 (citations omitted). 
106 Id. at 1732. 
107 Id. (citation omitted). 
108 Id. at 1727 (citation omitted). 
109 Id. at 1709. 
110 Id. at 1732–33. 
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“Indian” (2.7 percent), and “Native American” (2.0 percent).111  Of 
Native Americans surveyed, the term “Injun” was the most 
offensive (50.6 percent), followed by “squaw” (47.2 percent), 
“redskin” (36.6 percent), “buck” (27.7 percent), “Indian” (7.8 
percent), “brave” (7.0 percent), and “Native American” (2.8 
percent).112 
The respondents denied that the term “redskins” was 
scandalous or disparaging: 
[T]hrough long, substantial and widespread use, 
advertising and promotion in support thereof and 
media coverage, [the terms] have acquired [] 
secondary meaning . . . and . . . the [terms] . . . 
cannot reasonably be understood to refer to the 
Petitioners or to any of the groups or organizations 
to which they belong [as] the [trademarks] refer to 
the Washington Redskins football team . . . and . . . 
cannot be interpreted as disparaging any of the 
Petitioners or as bringing them into contempt or 
disrepute.113 
The respondents also argued that “disparagement requires 
intent on the part of the speaker and that its intent in adopting the 
team name was entirely positive as the team name has, over its 
history, reflected positive attributes of the American Indian such as 
dedication, courage and pride.”114 
In its decision, the TTAB examined the type of evidence that 
often is considered by courts when determining scandalousness 
and disparagement.115  The evidence included dictionary 
definitions, history, and linguistic analysis.116  Before the TTAB 
could decide whether the trademark was scandalous or 
disparaging, it first had to define scandalous and disparaging.117  
 
111 Id. at 1733.  Not surprisingly, the petitioner’s own expert criticized the methodology 
of the survey. Id. at 1734. 
112 Id. at 1733. 
113 Id. at 1708. 
114 Id. at 1721 (citations omitted). 
115 Id. at 1744. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1735–38. 
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The TTAB defined scandalous as “‘[g]iving offense to the 
conscience or moral feelings’” or “shocking to the sense of truth, 
decency, or propriety.”118  For a trademark to be scandalous it must 
be offensive to “American society as a whole” in order to be 
denied registration.119  The TTAB subsequently applied a two-step 
analysis to determine whether the trademark was scandalous.120  
First, it evaluated “the likely meaning of the matter in question,” 
and second, it determined whether “the matter [was] scandalous to 
a substantial composite of the general public.”121  Ultimately, the 
TTAB held that the term “redskins” was not scandalous.122  The 
TTAB suggested that the term “redskins” had a strong secondary 
meaning because people associated it with the football team and 
did not consider it a derogatory or racist term, and that a 
substantial composite of the general public would not find the term 
shocking and that the word would not offend the conscience, excite 
reprobation, or call out for condemnation.123 
The TTAB, relying on the dictionary, defined disparaging as 
matter that “‘may dishonor by comparison with what is inferior, 
slight, deprecate, degrade, or affect or injure by unjust 
comparison.’”124  Although a trademark must be offensive to 
society as a whole to be denied registration as scandalous, the 
TTAB suggested that only the views of the referenced group, here 
the Native Americans, should be considered when determining 
whether the trademark was disparaging.125  The TTAB again used 
a two-step analysis to evaluate whether the trademark was 
disparaging.126  First, the TTAB asked “[w]hat is the meaning of 
the matter in question, as it appears in the marks and as those 
marks are used in connection with the services identified in the 
 
118 Id. at 1735 (citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 211 U.S.P.Q. 668, 673 (C.C.P.A. 
1981)). 
119 Id. at 1738. 
120 Id. at 1736. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1748–49. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1738 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1947)).  In 
its analysis, the TTAB considered a survey that showed the term “redskin” to be 
offensive to 46.2 percent of the general public. Id. at 1738. 
125 Id. at 1739. 
126 Id. at 1740. 
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registrations” and second, the TTAB asked whether the trademark 
would disparage Native Americans.127 
In response to the first question, the TTAB determined that 
although the trademark had acquired a secondary meaning, it was 
still a term used to refer to Native Americans.128  The TTAB 
considered the dictionary meaning of the term, and stated that “[i]t 
is clear from the dictionary definitions and other evidence of 
record herein, and respondent does not dispute, that one denotative 
definition of ‘redskin(s)’ is a Native American person.”129  The 
TTAB also recognized that the term “redskins” as used by 
respondents was often used in connection with a portrait of a 
Native American profile.130  The TTAB, therefore, found that this 
was not a case where the term “redskins” had lost—through its use 
in professional football—its meaning as a reference to Native 
Americans and, thus, had gained an entirely independent meaning 
as the name of the franchise.131 
In response to the second question, the TTAB found that “the 
word ‘redskin,’ as it appears in respondent’s marks in those 
registrations and as used in connection with the identified services, 
may disparage Native Americans, as perceived by a substantial 
composite of Native Americans.”132  Because only the views of the 
referenced group are considered, the TTAB only considered how 
Native Americans perceived the trademark.133  Therefore, even 
though the TTAB found that the trademark had obtained a strong 
secondary meaning, the negative meaning that Native Americans 
associate with the trademark was enough to find the term 
disparaging.134  The TTAB held that the challenged trademark was 
 
127 Id. at 1740–41. 
128 Id. at 1740–42.  The TTAB noted that, although the vast majority of the uses of 
“redskin(s)” had been in the press and other media since at least the 1960s referring to the 
professional football team rather than to Native Americans. Id.  At the same time, it 
found that the football team’s registered marks bore substantial evidence of Native 
American imaging. Id. 
129 Id. at 1741. 
130 Id. at 1740–41. 
131 Id. at 1742. 
132 Id. at 1743. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1747. 
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disparaging to Native Americans and, therefore, was not entitled to 
trademark protection.135  Based on the “cumulative effect of the 
entire record,” the TTAB held that the “disparaging connotation of 
‘redskin(s)’ as a term of reference for Native Americans 
extend[ed] to the word ‘Redskin(s)’ as it appear[ed] in subject 
marks and as used in connection with respondent’s identified 
services.”136 
The TTAB was careful to announce that it was deciding only 
the narrow question of “whether, under the Section 2(a) grounds 
asserted, the service marks that [were] the subjects of the six 
registrations in this proceeding shall remain registered.”137  
Although the TTAB invalidated the trademarks on the term 
“Redskins” and its derivatives, the TTAB found that there was no 
evidence that graphics used by Pro-Football were disparaging 
because petitioners had not established under section 2(a) that the 
spear design and the portrait of a Native American profile that 
appeared in two of the registered marks disparaged Native 
Americans.138 
The TTAB found no support in the record—and, thus, 
rejected—the proposition that the use of Native American 
references or imagery by non-Native Americans was per se 
disparaging to Native Americans or that such use in connection 
with football was per se disparaging.139  Therefore, although the 
TTAB held that the trademark should be cancelled, it did not rule 
that the use of Native American names and images was per se 
disparaging to Native Americans.140 
B. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s Reversal 
of the TTAB’s Decision 
Pro-Football appealed the TTAB decision to the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia.141  Pro-Football argued several 
 
135 Id. at 1749. 
136 Id. at 1743, 1748. 
137 Id. at 1740. 
138 Id. at 1743. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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reasons why the court should overturn the TTAB’s decision.  First, 
it argued that the trademarks did not disparage Native Americans 
and did not bring Native Americans into contempt or disrepute.142  
Second, it asserted that section 2(a) of the Lanham Act was 
unconstitutional because it was a vague, overbroad, content-based 
restriction on speech.143  It further argued that section 2(a) was 
unduly vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment.144  Finally, Pro-
Football  contended that the cancellation petition was barred by the 
doctrine of laches.145 
The district court considered cross-motions for summary 
judgment.146  Pro-Football moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that the trademarks were not disparaging, that the trademarks did 
not and would not bring Native Americans into contempt or 
disrepute, and that laches barred the suit.147  The Native Americans 
also moved for summary judgment, arguing the district court 
should affirm the TTAB decision and that the laches claim should 
be rejected.148  Neither party appealed the issue of 
scandalousness.149  After considering motions from parties and the 
evidence on the record, the district court held that the TTAB’s 
finding of disparagement was not supported by substantial 
evidence and the suit was barred by laches, and consequently 
reversed the TTAB decision.150 
In reaching its holding, the district court first considered the 
standard of review that should be afforded to administrative 
decisions of the TTAB.151  The district court held that a court 
should review decisions from the TTAB under the substantial 
evidence test, which means that a court should reverse a TTAB’s 
findings of fact only if they are “unsupported by substantial 
 
142 Id. at 1142. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D.D.C. 2003). 
147 Id. at 100. 
148 Id. at 102. 
149 Id. at 124. 
150 Id. at 141. 
151 Id. at 114. 
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evidence.”152  The district court stated that “[t]he substantial 
evidence standard requires the reviewing court to ask whether a 
‘reasonable mind might accept’ a particular evidentiary record as 
‘adequate to support a conclusion.’”153  Although the appellant 
bears the burden of arguing that the TTAB decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence, the court reviews the TTAB’s 
legal conclusions de novo.154  Whether a trademark is disparaging 
“is ultimately a fact-bound conclusion that rests with the fact-
finder.”155  The reviewing court assesses the application of the 
legal principles to the TTAB’s findings of fact under the 
substantial evidence test.156  The district court also noted that 
challengers, at the agency level, “needed to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the challenged trademarks 
‘may disparage’ Native Americans or ‘bring them into contempt, 
or disrepute.’”157 
Next, the district court bifurcated its analysis.  It first evaluated 
the meaning of the term “redskins” as it appeared in the trademarks 
in connection with the services identified by those marks.  Second, 
the district court asked whether the meaning may disparage Native 
Americans.158  As to the first consideration, it held that the 
TTAB’s determination that the word “redskins” referred both to 
 
152 Id. at 102. 
153 Id. at 115–16 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 
(1938)). 
154 Id. at 116. 
155 Id. at 117.  Neither of the parties argued that the TTAB’s decision to treat 
“disparage” in the same manner as “contempt or disrepute” was error, so the court 
reviewed the issue of whether the marks “may disparage” Native Americans as whether 
the marks “bring Native Americans into contempt or disrepute.” Id. at 114.  The court 
found no error in the TTAB’s legal determination of the meaning of the term. Id. at 124–
25. 
156 Id. at 115. 
157 Id. at 122.  The court also suggested that, although the standard of proof does not 
change, “in the context of cancellation proceedings where a lengthy period of time ensues 
between registration and the cancellation request, the [TTAB] is required to pay even 
closer attention to the proof adduced to buttress the cancellation request.” Id. at 123.  The 
court went on to state that “‘the longer a party waits, after the time for bringing an 
opposition has expired, to commence a cancellation proceeding, the greater may be the 
number of facts (e.g., evidence of actual confusion) to be considered in determining the 
quantum of proof required.’” Id.  (quoting Massey Junior Coll., Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of 
Tech., 492 F.2d 1399, 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1974)). 
158 Id. at 126. 
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Native Americans and the Washington football team was 
supported by substantial evidence.159  Regarding the second 
consideration, however, the district court held that the TTAB’s 
determination that the six trademarks may disparage Native 
Americans was not supported by substantial evidence.160 
The district court concluded that the TTAB’s determination 
was logically flawed and that the TTAB “failed to apply the 
correct legal standard to its own findings of fact.”161  The district 
court’s rationale for its conclusion was that “there [was] no direct 
evidence in the findings that answer[ed] the legal question posed 
by the [TTAB].”162  The district court indicated that the TTAB 
erred in failing to consider direct evidence that the trademark 
disparaged Native Americans in connection with the use of the 
trademark during the time the trademark was issued.163 
In addition, the district court held the TTAB’s use of dictionary 
evidence, historical evidence, and survey evidence to conclude that 
“redskins” was derogatory was not sufficient evidence to support 
the TTAB’s determination.164  It suggested that the TTAB’s 
conclusion that the word was offensive because the dictionaries 
provided usage labels indicating that the use of the word was 
offensive or slang was “without any basis because there [was] no 
evidence in the record that was credited as to the purpose and 
methodology for including or not including usage labels in 
dictionaries or an explanation as to the basis for their 
conclusion.”165  Thus, the district court held that the TTAB’s 
“findings related to the significance of the dictionary evidence 
[were] not supported by substantial evidence.”166  The historical 
evidence was likewise found to be inadequate, as no evidence 
supported the conclusion that “the drop-off of the use of the term” 
was correlated to a determination that the term was pejorative.167 
 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 127. 
161 Id. at 125–26. 
162 Id. at 127. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 135–36. 
165 Id. at 130. 
166 Id. at 131. 
167 Id. at 132. 
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The district court further held that the TTAB erred in 
dismissing criticism of the survey evidence.168  Pro-Football’s 
expert witness suggested that the questions in the survey were 
leading and not neutral, that the lists of words referring to Native 
Americans contained an insufficient number of terms, that the use 
of the term “offensive” in the survey questions did not determine 
the necessary information for a determination of disparagement 
under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, and, finally, that the 
questions about what others thought led to ambiguous results.169  
The expert concluded that (1) the Native American sample was too 
geographically limited to be representative, (2) the method used to 
determine whether a participant was a Native American was 
flawed, (3) the sample method used violated the randomness of the 
survey, (4) the age requirements for the survey included 
participants who could not reflect the state of mind of people in 
1967, and (5) there was a less than fifty percent response rate to the 
survey, which made it a very weak probability survey.170  The 
district court held that the TTAB’s findings were in error because 
the survey—which consisted of contemporary attitudes as of the 
time of the survey—was not a sound nor an adequate 
representation of the views of the two populations sampled.171  The 
district court held that “there is substantial evidence for the narrow 
conclusion that the survey represents nothing more than a survey 
of current attitudes at the time the survey was conducted.”172  
Because the TTAB did not consider the relevant criticism of the 
survey, the district court held that “[l]eft completely unexplained, 
the [district court] cannot accept that the . . . [s]urvey is a sufficient 
proxy for the views of Native Americans as a whole.”173 
Finally, the district court held that the TTAB’s finding that 
“within the relevant time periods, the derogatory connotation of the 
word ‘redskin(s)’ in connection with Native Americans extends to 
the term ‘Redskin(s)’ as used in [Pro-Football’s] marks in 
 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 110. 
170 Id. at 110–11. 
171 Id. at 119–20 (citing Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1734 
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 1999)). 
172 Id. at 119 (citation omitted). 
173 Id. at 120. 
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connection with the identified services, such that [Pro-Football’s] 
marks may be disparaging of Native Americans to a substantial 
composite of this group of people” was not supported by 
substantial evidence.174  The district court held that the TTAB did 
little analysis as to how Native Americans were disparaged by the 
use of the trademarks in connection with Pro-Football’s 
services.175  Essentially, the TTAB found the name to be 
pejorative, and then assumed that the marks were disparaging, 
without observing actual evidence of such.176  The district court 
also found that, in the alternative, because of the delay in 
challenging the trademark, laches barred the petitioners’ suit.177 
In addition, the district court was troubled that the TTAB did 
not consider evidence of attitudes during the relevant time period 
and evidence of the use of the trademark in connection with the 
services it represents.  The district court thus held that the evidence 
that the TTAB considered was not sufficient to support 
cancellation. 
C. The Impact of Harjo 
Although the trademark “Redskins,” arguably the most 
offensive Native American name used for professional or 
collegiate sports teams,178 was not cancelled, opponents of the use 
 
174 Id. at 133 (citing Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 136. 
178 See Jay Cooper & Omer Gillham, When Mascot Names Offend, TULSA WORLD, May 
17, 2001, at A13 (noting that Ross Swimmer, former Cherokee chief and former director 
of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, states that he does not mind the name “Chieftain” 
for a team name, although other Native Americans may not like it, but that for him the 
term “Redskin” for a team name is particularly offensive); Gokavi, supra note 3, at 1D 
(explaining that Jim Harding, who is part-Native American, does not “like the name 
Redskins” but has no problem “with Warriors or Chieftains or Braves”); John J. Miller, 
Civil Rights Panel Should Get It Right: Indian Nicknames a Badge of Honor, INVESTOR’S 
BUS. DAILY, Apr. 11, 2001, at A22 (suggesting that team names are a “sign of respect” 
and that protesters’ concerns “may be reasonable in a few isolated cases, such as the 
Washington Redskins or a high school using the name Savages in conjunction with a 
cartoonish Indian mascot”); Price, supra note 3, at 70 (stating that “[w]hile those who 
support names such as the Seminoles (Florida State) and Braves can argue that the words 
celebrate Native American traditions, applying that claim to the Redskins is absurd.”); 
Mascots in the News, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 27, 2001, at C3 (“Tim Lane, who headed the 
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of Native American names and caricatures for team names, logos, 
and mascots argue that such usage is morally wrong and denies 
Native Americans dignity and self-respect.179  Scholars argued that 
in the wake of the TTAB decision in Harjo, owners of trademarked 
Native American names and images would be in danger of losing 
their protection.180  They proposed that trademark law may provide 
the means for reform because it could be used to “remove the 
financial incentives, or ‘business considerations’ team owners rely 
on to justify their decision to maintain Native American team 
names.”181  Although the district court reversed the TTAB’s 
decision to cancel the trademark, it based its analysis on the 
insufficiency of the evidence.182  It did not hold that any other 
mark using Native American terms could not be cancelled as 
disparaging.183  In other words, other marks may still be attacked. 
Other possible targets of trademark cancellation include the 
Atlanta “Braves,” the Chicago “Blackhawks,” the Cleveland 
“Indians,” the Kansas City “Chiefs,” the Florida State University 
 
Huntley [high school] Booster Club for several years, is of Delaware Indian descent and 
doesn’t mind the name [Redskins for the high school].”).  Suzan Harjo went on record as 
saying that “[Redskin] is the worst name you can call Native Americans in the English 
language.” Kalpana Srinivasan, Washington Redskins to Appeal Decision Over 
Trademark Loss, CHATANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Apr. 4, 1999 at A17. 
179 See Behrendt, supra note 3, at 397; see also U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra 
note 29 (calling for an end to the use of Native American images and team names and 
suggesting that they “are particularly inappropriate and insensitive in light of the long 
history of forced assimilation that American Indian people have endured in this 
country”). 
180 Behrendt, supra note 3, at 390, 414 (“The [TTAB] decision to cancel the Washington 
Redskins’ marks will likely persuade nonprofessional sports teams with Native American 
names, mascots and logos to do away with their Native American symbolism.”).  
Behrendt also suggests that “[a] likely result of the cancellation of the Washington 
Redskins’ trademarks will be the promotion of public sympathy in favor of abandoning 
discriminatory names, mascots and logos.” Id. at 391–92; see also Guggenheim, supra 
note 16, at 213 (pointing out that the Redskins decision “may be instructive as to the 
success of challenging Chief Wahoo’s [the Cleveland Indian’s mascot] registration 
rights”). 
181 Kelber, supra note 3, at 551.  Kelber suggests that “[d]ue to the lack of protection 
available for marks that are deemed scandalous, immoral, or disparaging, trademark law 
can force owners of Native American team marks to carefully reconsider their use.  In so 
doing, trademark law has the ability to respond to the social ills of racism in cases where 
owners of Native American team marks have ignored their responsibility.” Id. at 576. 
182 See supra Part III.C. 
183 Id. 
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“Seminoles,” the University of Illinois “Fighting Illini,” and the 
University of North Dakota “Fighting Sioux.”  The first obstacle 
that opponents of the use of Native American terms as team names 
will face in a trademark cancellation proceeding is proving that the 
mark is indeed scandalous or disparaging.  As proponents of such 
use point out, although many Native American leaders and 
activists oppose the marks, most people, including Native 
Americans generally, do not find the use of Native American tribal 
names and images as team names and mascots offensive.184  The 
remainder of this Article will consider whether these marks would 
be found disparaging if challenged, and whether trademark 
cancellation would cause the use of such marks to cease. 
IV.  THE DIFFICULTY OF PROVING THAT THE TRADEMARKS  
ARE DEROGATORY AND THAT THEY ACTUALLY  
REFER TO NATIVE AMERICANS 
Opponents of the use of Native American terms and images as 
team names and mascots have a difficult case to prove.  If 
opponents want to argue that the trademarked terms are 
disparaging and should be cancelled, they must first prove that the 
terms indeed refer to Native Americans.185  That might be an easy 
 
184 See Joseph Perkins, Let’s Get Real in This Silly Debate Over Team Mascots, 
VENTURA COUNTY STAR, May 20, 2002, at B06 (suggesting that “four of five American 
Indians said that professional teams—like the Redskin[s]—should not stop using Indian 
nicknames, mascots or symbols”); see also Price, supra note 3, at 68–69.  Betty Ann 
Gross, a member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux tribe “wants Indian mascots and the 
tomahawk chop discarded, but she has no problem with team names like the Fighting 
Sioux (University of North Dakota) or even the Redskins.” Id.  Leigh J. Kuwanwisiwma, 
director of the Hopi Cultural preservation and “avid devotee of the Atlanta Braves,” is 
not offended by the tomahawk chop or Native American nicknames “as long as they’re 
not meant to be derogatory.” Id. at 69.  A poll conducted by Sports Illustrated suggests 
that eighty-one percent of Native Americans do not think that college and high school 
teams should stop using Native American names and mascots, and eighty-three percent 
do not think pro teams should stop. Id.; see also Masters, supra note 25, at A1 (“Because 
[the Harjo] decision focused very sharply on the term ‘redskin’ and its linguistic history, 
it does not necessarily make other teams with Native American names vulnerable to 
similar challenges, lawyers said. The same survey that showed nearly half of respondents 
consider ‘redskin’ offensive found that only ten percent of those surveyed felt the same 
way about the word ‘braves.’”); supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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task for the trademark “Indians,” but may be more challenging for 
trademarks like “Braves.”  Even if the first requirement is met, 
opponents must prove that Native Americans find the term 
derogatory.  This task was difficult for the trademark “Redskins”—
arguably the most offensive term in use—and might be nearly 
impossible for a term like “Braves.” 
Even if both of the requirements are met and the trademark is 
cancelled, the use of the mark will not necessarily cease.  
Trademark cancellation does not mean that the owner must stop 
using a mark; it simply means that the owner may not stop others 
from using the mark.  In theory, if the owner is obtaining revenue 
from the mark, then there exists a financial motive to cease using 
the cancelled mark and to begin using another mark.  Although this 
would stop profitable enterprises like professional sports from 
using the marks in theory, this may not be the result in practice.  
Because of the financial structure of the NFL, individual football 
teams will see little financial impact from the cancellation of their 
trademarks.  Other, less profitable organizations, such as school 
teams, might see no financial impact at all. 
A. Proving That the Trademarks Actually Refer to Native 
Americans 
Opponents attempting to cancel a trademarked Native 
American term as disparaging must first prove that the term 
actually refers to Native Americans.  In the Harjo case, the TTAB 
considered several types of evidence to determine whether the term 
“Redskins” referred to Native Americans.  The TTAB suggested 
that the term had to have “one denotative definition” of a Native 
American, and did not find that the only definition had to be a 
Native American.186  The TTAB considered dictionary definitions, 
historical use of the term, and the use of a Native American profile 
in connection with the trademark.187  The district court agreed with 
 
186 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1741 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 
1999); see supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
187 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740–43; see supra notes 128–31. 
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the TTAB’s determination that “Redskins” referred to Native 
Americans.188 
Each of the teams named “Braves,” “Blackhawks,” “Indians,” 
“Chiefs,” “Seminoles,” “Illini,” and “Sioux” arguably refer to 
Native Americans.  The term “Indian” is used interchangeably with 
the term “Native American.”  The terms “Blackhawks,” 
“Seminoles,” “Illini,” and “Sioux,” are proper names for Native 
American tribes.  The terms “Braves” and “Chiefs,” however, are 
words in common usage and can be argued to contain secondary 
meaning. 
In Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, “Indian” has 
several definitions, including “American Indian.”189  From the 
dictionary definition, it is clear that it is a term referring to Native 
Americans.  Because each of the terms “Blackhawks,” 
“Seminoles,” “Illini,” and “Sioux” are proper tribal names, a court 
likely would determine that these terms also reference Native 
Americans.190  “Brave” has three main definitions, the third being 
“one who is brave,” with “American Indian warrior” given as a 
specific example.191  “Chief” has three main definitions in the 
dictionary.192  The first definition is “the head or leader of any 
body of men . . . a headman (as of a tribe, clan, or family),” but the 
dictionary does not make specific reference to Native 
Americans.193 
The analysis does not end merely by looking at the dictionary 
definitions.  The TTAB in Harjo also considered historical use of 
the term.194  Each of the terms above has been used historically to 
refer to Native Americans.  Also, the use of Native American 
pictures or caricatures in association with the terms is indicative of 
 
188 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2003); see supra 
note 159 and accompanying text. 
189 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1149 (3d ed. 1961).  The TTAB 
in Harjo considered several dictionaries, including Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738. 
190 See, e.g., Guggenheim, Renaming the Redskins, supra note 82, at 304 (“Cleary, the 
name ‘Seminoles’ refers to the Native American tribe.”). 
191 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 189, at 269. 
192 Id. at 378. 
193 Id. 
194 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741; see supra notes 128–29. 
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their meaning.  The use of both Native American caricatures and 
Native American terms likely would sway any court to hold that 
the terms refer to Native Americans.195  In Harjo, the TTAB 
appeared to be particularly swayed by the use of a Native 
American profile in connection with the word-mark.196  Because 
each of the teams uses Native American images in connection with 
its word-marks, a court likely would determine that each above 
term refers to Native Americans.197 
Although the terms “Braves” and “Chiefs” have several 
meanings that might indicate that the terms have developed 
secondary meanings, a court likely would find that those terms 
refer to Native Americans.  Neither the TTAB nor the district court 
in Harjo were persuaded that the evidence of secondary meaning 
of “Redskins” outweighed the proof that the term referred to 
Native Americans.198  Therefore, because similar proof exists for 
“Braves” and Chiefs,” a court considering only the definitions of 
the terms probably would find that each of these terms refer to 
Native Americans. 
In sum, a court considering the definitions of the terms, the 
historical usage of the terms, and the use of Native American 
images in connection with the terms likely would find that each of 
the terms actually refer to Native Americans.  The possibility that 
some of the terms might have obtained a secondary meaning is 
unlikely to outweigh the evidence that the terms refer to Native 
Americans because of the use of images in connection with the 
terms. 
B. Even If the Mark Does Refer to Native Americans, It Might Not 
Be Derogatory 
The second element that opponents of a trademark must show 
in order to cancel a mark as disparaging is that the term is 
derogatory to Native Americans.  A disparaging mark is one that 
dishonors by association with that which is inferior or slight, or 
 
195 See supra notes 14–20. 
196 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740–41; see supra note 130. 
197 See Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 232 (“There is no question that the Chief Wahoo 
image refers to Native Americans.”). 
198 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738; see supra note 124. 
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that deprecates, degrades, or injures by unjust comparison.199  
When evaluating whether a term is derogatory enough to be 
cancelled, only the views of the referenced group at the time the 
mark was filed are considered.200 
1. The Use of Native American Terms Likely Is Not 
Derogatory 
Given that “Redskins”—arguably the most demeaning term for 
Native Americans—was not found to be derogatory in Harjo, other 
less demeaning marks likely would also be upheld if challenged.201  
That “Redskins” is the most demeaning can be inferred from the 
fact it was the first Native American team name trademark to be 
challenged.  Also, the survey provided by the petitioners in Harjo 
suggested that the term is the most offensive in use.  In the 
petitioner’s survey, “redskin” was found offensive by 36.6 percent 
of Native Americans surveyed, in comparison with 7.8 percent for 
“Indian” and 7.0 percent for “brave.”202  Yet, the TTAB refused to 
cancel the challenged trademark on the Native American profile,203 
and rejected the suggestion “that the use of Native American 
references or imagery by non-Native Americans [was], essentially, 
per se disparaging to Native Americans . . . .”204  The petitioners in 
Harjo also argued that the word “Redskin” had a “negative 
connotation . . . which [was] not conveyed by such terms as 
‘Indian,’ ‘Native American,’ or ‘American Indian.’”205 
Other evidence also indicates that Native Americans might not 
find other team names as offensive as “Redskins.”  In a poll 
conducted by Sports Illustrated, eighty-one percent of Native 
Americans questioned did not think that college and high school 
teams should stop using Native American mascots, logos, and 
names, and eighty-three percent did not think professional teams 
 
199 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738. 
200 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 128–29 (D.D.C. 2003); see also 
Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
201 See supra note 178. 
202 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1733; see supra text accompanying note 112. 
203 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743; see supra note 138. 
204 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743; see supra note 139. 
205 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
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should stop.206  Many other Native Americans suggest that the 
term “redskin” offends them, but terms like “braves,” “Seminoles,” 
and “Sioux” do not.207  Suzan Harjo called the term “redskin” “the 
worst name you can call Native Americans in the English 
language.”208 
Whether Native Americans find the trademarks “Braves,” 
“Blackhawks,” “Indians,” “Chiefs,” “Seminoles,” “Illini,” or 
“Sioux” derogatory will require fact specific questions.  The 
surveys presented in the Harjo case and Sports Illustrated, as well 
as individual testimonials, indicate that many Native Americans 
probably do not find the uses derogatory.  As the discussion above 
indicates, none of the dictionary definitions includes a usage that 
warns of any derogatory meaning.  Further, none of the terms have 
the same historically-unfortunate impact as the term “Redskins” 
does.  In Harjo, the TTAB explicitly rejected the suggestion that 
the use of Native American terms for sports team names was per se 
derogatory.209  Similarly, the district court held that the 
voluminous evidence provided by the petitioners was not enough 
to prove that the term was derogatory.210  Therefore, it appears 
unlikely that the other marks will face trademark cancellation.211 
2. The Use of Native American Images Might Be Derogatory 
Even though the team names alone might not be derogatory, 
the use of Native American-derived mascots and logos might be 
found to be derogatory.  The TTAB in Harjo found that the 
challenged drawings were not disparaging, but those marks were 
described as simple, benign profiles of Native Americans.212  
 
206 Price, supra note 3, at 69; see supra note 184. 
207 See supra notes 178–84. 
208 Kalpana Srinivasan, Federal Trademark Panel Rules to Cancel Logo Registration, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1999, at A1; see supra note 184. 
209 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
210 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (D.D.C. 2003). 
211 See Blankenship, supra note 34, at 455 (“Although it is too soon to tell what effect 
[the TTAB’s] decision will have on other sports teams, it seems unlikely that many 
institutions will be subject to the same sort of legal action that the Redskins have been, 
simply because there are few names and logos that are as offensive as REDSKINS.  The 
decision itself was limited to the mark REDSKINS in its various forms.”). 
212 Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743; see supra note 138. 
1 HUGHEY FORMAT 4/26/2004  12:18 PM 
2004] IMPACT OF HARJO ON NATIVE AMERICAN MARKS 361 
Neither the district court nor the TTAB held that other, less benign 
images could not be found disparaging. 
Many teams trademark drawings of their mascots.213  For 
example, the Atlanta Braves own several trademarks on images of 
Native American men’s heads with Mohawks and feathers in their 
hair.214  The trademarked visage of the Cleveland Indians’ mascot, 
Chief Wahoo, has been described as “grinning buck teeth and [a] 
hook nose.”215  The Cleveland Indians own several other 
trademarks on images, including a fat, cartoonish Native American 
man with a very large nose wearing an “Indians” jersey and 
leaning on a baseball bat,216 the head of a large-smiling, hook-
nosed Native American man with a single feather in his hair and a 
small braid,217 and the head of a large-smiling, big-nosed Native 
American man with a single feather in his hair.218  Although the 
trademarked words might not be prone to cancellation, these 
images are ripe for trademark cancellation proceedings. 
Whether the marks are derogatory to Native Americans likely 
will hinge on the proof provided.  Based on the results of the 
surveys from the Harjo case and Sports Illustrated, and evidence 
from other sources, it appears that Native Americans consider the 
names derogatory.  None of the surveys considered the nature of 
some of the trademarked images however.  Although many of the 
trademarked images appear to be as benign as the images 
considered in Harjo, some of the trademarked images are well 
outside of what the TTAB and district court examined, and, thus, 
may be deemed derogatory material. 
 
213 See supra notes 14–20. 
214 U.S. Trademark Reg. Nos. 829,309 and 829,310; see TESS, supra note 14; see also 
supra note 14. 
215 Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 214; see supra note 16. 
216 U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,719,618; see TESS, supra note 14; supra note 16. 
217 U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,711,810; see TESS, supra note 14; supra note 16. 
218 U.S. Trademark Reg. Nos. 2,569,766, 1,590,703, 1,543,339, 1,259,795, and 
1,031,410; see TESS, supra note 14; supra note 16. 
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C. In Many Cases, There May Be No Financial Motive to Change 
the Name 
The reason trademark law has the potential to be the most 
effective legal route for opponents in the mascot controversy is 
because it may result in a serious negative financial impact on the 
trademark owner.  Without federal trademark protection, the team 
is still allowed to use the mark, but may not preclude others from 
using it.219  For example, if the trademark had been cancelled, the 
Redskins franchise would have to compete with unlicensed 
vendors for tee-shirt sales and other royalties.220 
1. Financial Impact on Professional Football Teams 
Although the cancellation of federal trademark protection can 
have a negative financial impact on the trademark owner generally, 
this likely is not the result for professional football teams.  Because 
of the unique profit-sharing of the NFL, the financial impact on 
any one franchise will be minor. 
Most scholars who have addressed the issue have been under 
the assumption that the cancellation of the “Redskins” trademark 
would cause a chain reaction wherein every team with an offensive 
name would suddenly stop using it.221  If the “Redskins” trademark 
had been cancelled, this likely would not have been the case.  
Because the NFL licenses marks and divides the proceeds evenly 
among the franchises, the cancellation of one or two trademarks 
would not impact the profits of an individual franchise or the 
league very much.222  If the trademark had been cancelled, other 
teams’ owners that could have lost money might have attempted to 
pressure the Redskins to change its name, but such an assertion is 
 
219 The franchise may still pursue claims under state law, but as discussed above, federal 
trademark registration is superior to state protection.  In addition, it is probable that states 
will follow the decision not to protect the marks. 
220 See Masters, supra note 25 (noting that Stephen R. Baird, one of the attorneys for the 
plaintiffs, suggested that the Harjo decision “is going to create all kinds of . . . legal 
defenses for anyone who wants to rip off Redskins T-shirts”). 
221 See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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speculative.223  The cancellation of the “Redskins” trademark 
probably would not even have the financial effect of ending the 
Washington team’s use of the term.  The only other Native 
American name in the NFL is used by the Kansas City Chiefs.  The 
Chiefs take part in the same profit-sharing plan as does the 
Washington team, and so a challenge to its trademark likely would 
have a minor financial impact.  Clearly, challenging the mark of 
any one team would have no real results. 
2. Financial Impact on Other Professional Sports Teams 
Just as teams in the NFL likely would not feel a significant 
financial impact from the cancellation of trademarks because of the 
profit-sharing structure of the NFL, the potential effect on other 
sports teams is also minimal.  Two MLB teams and one NHL team 
have Native American names and logos: the Atlanta “Braves,” the 
Cleveland “Indians,” and the Chicago “Blackhawks.”  MLB uses 
Major League Baseball Properties, Inc., an organization acting in 
the interest of both MLB and the individual teams, to license all 
the team trademarks.224  The NHL also engages in profit-sharing, 
with National Hockey League Services, Inc. licensing NHL team 
trademarks.225  Even if the Atlanta, Cleveland, and Chicago 
franchises lose their trademarks, the franchises will not be forced 
to bear the financial burden alone.  Whether the teams would be 
pressured to change their names by their respective leagues or 
would change their names for other reasons is also speculative.  
Although trademark cancellation has a theoretical negative 
financial impact on the trademark owner, the teams would not see 
a significant financial impact due to profit-sharing. 
 
223 Blankenship, supra note 34, at 453–54 (“[I]t is quite possible that other owners 
would pressure [the Redskins’ owner] into finally changing the name.  It is difficult, 
however, to speculate as to what such an eclectic group of wealthy multi-millionaires will 
choose to do.”). 
224 See supra note 26. 
225 See id. 
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3. Financial Impact on Collegiate Teams 
Unlike professional sports teams, collegiate teams do not 
engage in profit-sharing.226  Three collegiate teams, the University 
of Illinois “Fighting Illini,” the University of North Dakota 
“Fighting Sioux,” and the Florida State University “Seminoles,” 
use Native American names and logos.  Trademark cancellation, 
therefore, has the potential to financially affect these teams. 
The University of Illinois owns several trademarks, including 
the trademark “Fighting Illini” and a trademark on the symbol of 
the head of a Native American wearing a large, circular, feather 
headdress.227  Because the school relies on these trademarks to 
generate revenue, cancellation of these trademarks does have the 
potential to affect the school’s ability to collect revenue on the 
trademarks. 
In contrast, the University of North Dakota does not own a 
registered trademark, although one trademark application is 
currently pending on the “Ralph Engelstad Arena Home of the 
Fighting Sioux.”228  Therefore, any effort to cancel its trademark in 
an attempt to exert financial pressure on the school to change the 
name and logo of its sports teams is for naught. 
Florida State University reportedly earns as much as $1.8 
million a year selling merchandise with its name and mascot.229  
While the Florida Board of Regents owns several marks on behalf 
of Florida State University, including the trademark “FSU,”230 the 
school does not currently own any marks on “Seminoles,” though 
one is pending.231  Even if the school were to obtain a trademark 
on the name, cancellation of the trademark will not stop the school 
from licensing the trademarked mark “FSU.”  Because the school 
is not presently relying on a trademark on “Seminoles” for 
revenue—it is either selling merchandise covered by other 
trademarks or selling “Seminoles” merchandise without trademark 
 
226 See supra note 27. 
227 See supra note 19. 
228 See supra note 20. 
229 See supra note 13. 
230 See supra note 18. 
231 See id. 
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coverage—cancellation of the pending “Seminoles” trademark 
likely will not have a financial impact on the team. 
The alleged negative financial impact that would encourage 
teams to change their names due to trademark cancellation does 
not exist for most professional and collegiate teams in any 
meaningful way.  As such, trademark cancellation would not be a 
viable avenue to encourage many other teams, such as high schools 
and amateur teams, to change their names—given that most do not 
own trademarks.  Because of the nature of professional sports 
profit-sharing and the fact that many colleges rely little, if at all, on 
their trademarks for profit, the actual financial impact of trademark 
cancellation is minor.  Therefore, trademark cancellation alone 
does not have the ability to force a team to change its name. 
V.  ALTERNATIVES TO USING TRADEMARK ALONE 
Although it is debatable whether a majority of Native 
Americans find the use of Native American mascots, logos, and 
names offensive within the necessary definition for trademark law, 
it is a fact that many Native Americans, and other non-Native 
Americans, do find the uses insulting.232  It is possible that the law 
alone will not provide a solution to the Native American mascot 
controversy.  Many commentators have hailed trademark law as 
the legal avenue that will provide the answers, as it is designed to 
deny protection to “offensive” terms as determined by the 
referenced group.233  It is likely, however, as this Article has 
argued, that trademark law cannot provide the answer that 
opponents to the uses desire.  Although trademark law may not be 
designed to handle the issue, it does not mean that the issue is not 
important. 
Likewise, this Article is not suggesting that trademark 
cancellation proceedings are without merit.  Although the financial 
impact may be minor in some cases, it still exists.  While it is 
speculative whether other team owners will pressure the owners of 
the challenged trademarks to change their names, it is likely that 
 
232 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 36. 
233 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2002). 
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some owners will be concerned with any possible decrease in 
revenue.  It is likely that some owners will attempt to pressure the 
team of the cancelled trademark to change its name. 
More importantly, trademark cancellation proceedings raise 
public awareness that some people find the uses offensive.  When 
the “Redskins” trademark was cancelled, newspapers across the 
country ran headlines such as “Redskins Is Offensive, Team Loses 
Trademark” and “Redskins Are Denied Trademarks.”234  Although 
the TTAB’s decision to cancel the trademark was later overturned, 
this type of publicity has caused many primary, secondary, and 
collegiate teams to change their names.235  If opponents can force 
the cancellation of many different marks, including the 
trademarked images that are ripe for cancellation proceedings, they 
can send a message to teams and the public that the use of Native 
American mascots, logos, and names is unacceptable. 
Although trademark law arguably has been the most successful 
legal avenue to date, it is possible that the problem is not going to 
be solved by legal means.  Non-legal avenues such as protests, 
lobbying for legislation, and other methods of political pressure 
have been successful in raising awareness that the use of Native 
American mascots, logos, and names is offensive to many people.  
These protests have also been successful in forcing the change of 
names of many non-professional team names.  The best solution 
may be to continue to bring legal challenges to raise public 
awareness, whether they succeed or not, combined with protests 
and other means of political pressure. 
Even though the Native American population in the United 
States is statistically small, people like Suzan Harjo have been able 
to lead grassroots movements to decrease significantly the 
perceived racist uses of Native American symbols by sports teams.  
Once there were over 2,600 schools using mascots and names of 
Native Americans; now there are less than 600.236  Although 
trademark law may not provide the answer, opponents certainly 
will continue to protest the use of Native American mascots, logos, 
 
234 See Masters, supra note 3, at A1. 
235 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
236 Id. 
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and names, and may even be successful in ending the use of many 
of them. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the likely impact of the district 
court’s decision in Pro-Football, Inc v. Harjo on other Native 
American mascots, logos, and names.  It has provided an overview 
of the Native American mascot controversy, the structure of 
professional and collegiate licensing, and the attempts to limit use 
of Native American terms as mascots, logos, and names.  It also 
has reviewed trademark law generally and the prohibition of 
trademark protection for disparaging and scandalous marks.  The 
Article has concluded that the decision not to cancel the 
“Redskins” trademark probably will not affect most other Native 
American mascots, logos, and names.  Finally, this Article has 
suggested that legal and non-legal means combined may be the 
most effective avenue for challenging the offensive use of Native 
American names and images in professional team trademarks. 
 
 
